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ABSTRACT 
The paper deals with the nature of influence of opportunistic behavior of economic 
agents on the implementation of contractual cooperation. Opportunism can apply to any form of 
interaction between economic subjects; it implies an increase of transactional costs including the 
costs of destructive behavior and the costs of protection against third parties; the complexity and 
dearness of personal protection from the opportunistic behavior of counterparties. The findings 
of the investigation were made by using the dialectical method, the scientific methods, the author 
economy. It has been proved that the level of asset specificity determines the particular 
manifestations of opportunistic behavior in the implementation of the contractual relationship. 
The acceptance of the precondition of the impossibility of complete removal of the probability of 
opportunistic actions by at least one party of the transaction leads to the need for incomplete 
contract. The results can be used in improving the economic policy in the educational activity. 
The revealed laws provide the basis for further research in the field of behavioral economic 
theory. 
Keywords: economics, opportunistic behavior, contract, contractual relationship, 
transactional costs, abuse of trust. 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of studying the behavior of economic agents is explained by high 
significance of social factors in economic decision-making. At the same time, there is scarcity of 
empirical studies on particularization and revelation of laws of certain types of economic 
behavior. Opportunistic behavior has been insufficiently studied.  
The first scope of application of the term “opportunistic behavior” was political 
relationship. The approach to organizational relations in terms of opportunism was first 
described in 1986. Opportunistic behavior in this case is manifested in the fact that managers use 
the asymmetry of information in order to maximize their usefulness in determining the sum and 
contractual terms with contractors, loan agreements and relationships with regulators. The 
investors are led into error by inadequate information which is reflected in the documents. In 
addition, the opportunistic behavior of managers may become apparent in determining dividend 
policy. 
R. Watts and J. Zimmerman first used the categories of opportunism to explain the 
behavior of managers when announcing their margin of profit by influencing the contractual 
relationships in order to thus affect the wages and bonuses which are paid by the shareholders to 
the manager. D. Fudenberg and T. Tirole  have proved that the risk lover managers who do not 
have direct access to capital markets will have an incentive to participate in the receivership. 
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According to the studies the risks of opportunistic behavior are the key obstacles in the 
management of long supply chain in the field of transport logistics. 
The most common treatment of opportunistic behavior is the definition by O. Williamson 
who understands opportunism as “adherence to one’s own interests, including on false pretences, 
including here such obvious forms of deception as lie, stealing, fraud”. Behavioral uncertainty is 
an important factor in building the contractual relationship. Opportunism is one of the key 
assumptions for the existence of transactional costs, risks of opportunism are taken into account 
when making decisions on carrying out investment. A huge number of economic problems can 
be misinterpreted if opportunism is ignored. 
A. Buvik and T. Reve, De Vita, and A. Söllner point to the link between manifestations 
of opportunistic behavior and characteristics of the assets that are subject to contractual 
relationships. Moreover, the problem of opportunistic behavior in the implementation of the 
contractual relationship was considered in works by D. Parker, G. Baker , H. Xiao , S. Kunte , P. 
Casas-Arce  D. Campbell, D. Harris , K. Wathne , C. Cordes . 
However, cause-effect relation between the scope of opportunistic behavior and 
characteristics of the implementation of contractual relations requires further proof. 
METHODS 
Interpretations of the terms “opportunism” and “opportunistic behavior” were 
systematized by the representatives of different economic schools. We considered these relations 
by the contracts performed in the construction sector due to the availability of information on the 
distribution of the facts of opportunism in this area . 
To study the laws of opportunism in the performance of contractual interactions we 
carried out via next actions: the selection of the object of study; the study of the legal 
requirements, the opinions of the expert community; the study of documents on the execution of 
the contractual relationship, court decisions; interviewing of the parties of contractual relations; 
exposing common forms of opportunistic behavior, the description thereof; the verification of the 
findings on the basis of judicial opinion. 
RESULTS 
Based on the analysis carried out the key areas of usage of the term opportunism are 
presented in (Table 1). 
Table 1 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE OPPORTUNISM MANIFESTATIONS ACCORDING TO THE STANDPOINTS 
OF DIFFERENT SCIENTIFIC SCHOOLS
i
 
№ Schools Treatment of the  content of the category  “opportunism” 
1 Savage capitalism 
The roots of opportunism are in the mindset, transformed into actions that 
lead to fraud  
2 Marxist theory 
Opportunism as abandonment of revolutionary struggle of proletariat 
(workers) 
3 Constitutional  economics Opportunism as difference in behavior of politicians before and after election 
4 Labor  opportunism 
Opportunism as behavior of wage laborers, conflicting with the interests of 
managers   
5 Organizational relations Opportunism as behavior of wage managers, conflicting with the corporate 
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objectives on the whole 
6 Economics of discrimination Opportunism as discrimination of  the subjects of contracting parties 
7 Institutional theory Opportunism as keeping on one’s own interests, including   fraudulently 
8 Neo-institutional  theory Opportunistic behavior as masked element of transaction costs 
Implementation of opportunistic actions by the subjects suggests the occurrence of loss in 
the form of additional costs. The influence of opportunism on costs has not been directly studied 
(R. Dahlstrom and A. Nygaard). As the result of the analysis of the documents related to the 
contracts on specific and idiosyncratic assets, interviewing experts, implementation of the 
contracts have been divided into three stages. At each stage of implementation of the contract the 
patterns of opportunistic behavior have been identified. The results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
PATTERNS OF OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR IN DIFFERENT PHASES OF CONTRACT 
IMPLEMENTATION
ii
 
Stages of contract 
implementation / 
Subject of 
opportunistic  actions 
Signing a 
contract 
Execution of works Settlement for executed works 
Customer 
1. Omission of
well-defined 
work statement 
2. Task alteration for works
3. Payment delay for works;
4. Groundless claims  to quality of
work 
Contractor 
1. Input item
manipulation 
2. Application of less costly
materials; 
3. Appeal to less-skilled workers
4. Baseless inclusion of additional
items of expenditure into acts; 
5. Forming cost sheets, without
correcting quantity of work put 
into cost but not executed   
According to the results, input item manipulation often include widespread 
manifestations of opportunistic behavior, such as: 
1. Inclusion of additional types of work due to excessively well-defined work statement;
2. Unjustified use of conversion factors of cost of works according then-current dollars;
3. The use of excessive overhead rate;
4. Record keeping in the project documentation or estimate for expensive materials
overstating costs estimation.
It has been found that the expense ratio to payroll varies under contractor's agreement 
from 28.8 to 89.3% of the direct costs of the project implementation. At that, according to 
statistical data, labor costs with taxes account for 25.0% of the costs of construction 
organizations. Artificial setting the showing too high is the fact of opportunistic behavior. 
The level of the estimated profit ranges from 15.0% in the estimates for maintenance of 
engineering systems, and up to 65.0% according to the standards of methodological documents 
in construction. The amount of overheads also signifies 35-95.0%. The materials expense ratio to 
the total value of factor costs is 5-68.2%. This variation may be caused by intentional actions of 
the economic agents, as well as accidental mistakes due to the limited cognitive capacities of 
man. In any case, all this generates behavior costs that influence financial performance of the 
preparation and execution of the contract. 
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SUMMARY 
It has been revealed that all the selected types of opportunism can be implemented both 
with third party practice and without. In the case of third party practice, there is a conspiracy 
with other persons who are not directly involved in the transaction but act as covert agents. For 
example, cost item manipulation on the cost estimates for the types of work constitutes abuse of 
confidence of the customer, as the contractor keeps, as a rule, more complete information 
regarding the estimate valuation mechanisms as compared with the customer. The influence of 
confidence on building economic relations between firms has been previously also considered in 
work by R. Woolthuis . 
The preconditions of manifestation of opportunistic behavior at the conclusion of the 
contract are: 1) high cost of measurements of quantity and  quality of the works performed, the 
services rendered, the materials used; 2) more complex mechanism of documentation of 
contractual relations in comparison with other types of contracts; 3) a wide variety of 
requirements of the customers to the percentage value of a number of indicators of estimate 
documents; 4) lack of knowledge of the technologies of implementation of works on creating a 
specific asset for the customer. 
One way is the transference of certain operations to outsourcing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is revealed that all the manifestations of opportunistic behavior in terms of contract 
relationship may be implemented with the involvement of third parties and without them. In the 
case of involvement of third parties, there is a conspiracy of one of the parties of contractual 
relations with other persons. 
To neutralize the incentives to opportunistic behavior one suggests to specify in the 
contract measurable requirements for the quantity and quality of the working data; key 
parameters checkout mechanisms; requirements for professional skill level of the staff. However, 
more important is to raise the level of trust in inter-firm relationships. Thus, D. Deedsa, C. Hill 
have found the proof that stable relations between the partners are far more effective deterrent to 
opportunistic action than making investments in more detailed presentation of the terms of 
contracts and claims. The researchers S. Wuyts and I. Geyskens have come to the similar results. 
Besides, Deligonul believes that tolerance limit for the opportunistic behavior for the 
international partnership should be higher due to the larger barrier diversion to another supplier 
in the international environment. Reputation effects provide group insurance for the buyers of 
opportunism of the supplier . 
In some cases, it is reasonable to attract third-party organizations performing the role of a 
technical customer; the creation of self-regulatory organizations. This is consistent with the 
findings of M. Granovetter, according to his research the most effective ways to prevent 
opportunistic actions of economic agents is to strengthen network ties between the participants of 
the transaction. The researchers also point out that in this case, opportunism is constrained by 
notions of justice . 
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